Twenty Questions about Filing under Revised Article 9: The Rules of the Game under New Part 5 by Sigman, Harry C.
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 74
Issue 3 Symposium on Revised UCC Article 9 Article 3
June 1999
Twenty Questions about Filing under Revised
Article 9: The Rules of the Game under New Part 5
Harry C. Sigman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Harry C. Sigman, Twenty Questions about Filing under Revised Article 9: The Rules of the Game under New Part 5, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
861 (1999).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol74/iss3/3
TWENTY QUESTIONS ABOUT FILING UNDER REVISED
ARTICLE 9:
THE RULES OF THE GAME UNDER NEW PART 5
HARRY C. SIGMAN*
Article 9's filing provisions have been significantly rewritten.
Under Revised Article 9, for most transactions, filing should be as
simple as child's play. The new provisions are intended to place
virtually all filings in a single statewide office, facilitate electronic
filing, foster nationwide utilization of well-designed user-friendly
uniform paper forms, and make filing office practices more efficient,
transparent, and uniform. This article presents the key concepts,
structure, and terminology of new Part 5 in the format of a series of
fact situations. The hypotheticals are intended to present the rules
and principles systematically but in a working context. Except as
otherwise indicated, all references are to Revised Article 9.
Q1. Debtor's name, as shown in its corporate charter, is "The
Best Lawyers in the World, Inc." The financing statement filed
provided the debtor's name as "Best Lawyers in the World." Has
Debtor's correct name been provided? Is the financing statement
sufficient?
Al. Section 9-502(a)(1) provides that a financing statement is
not sufficient if it fails to provide the name of the debtor. Section
9-503 provides specific rules elaborating on how a debtor's name is
sufficiently provided. In this case, Debtor is a corporation and most
likely fits within the newly defined category of "registered
organization."1 Section 9-503(a)(1) states that the financing statement
sufficiently provides the name of a debtor that is a registered
organization only if it provides the name indicated on the public
record of the debtor's jurisdiction of organization. Thus, the debtor's
correct name has not been provided, and the case presents the issue
* Mr. Sigman was a member of the Drafting Committee to revise Article 9. The views
expressed herein, however, are solely his. These questions are based on problems used at a
Financial Lawyers Conference seminar. The author wishes to thank Steven L. Harris for his
assistance in preparing the questions and helpful suggestions concerning the answers. Errors,
however, are solely the author's. © 1999 Harry C. Sigman, all rights reserved.
1. See R. § 9 -102(a)(70).
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of an error in the debtor name.
Section 9-506(a), continuing the rule under Former section
9-402(8), states: "A financing statement substantially satisfying the
requirements of this part is effective, even if it has minor errors or
omissions, unless the errors or omissions make the financing
statement seriously misleading." The text adds a reference to
"omissions" for the sake of completeness, but this is unlikely to alter
any result that would have been reached under the former language,
as an omission is a form of error. Supplementing the general rule of
condemning errors that are seriously misleading, in a provision
specifically addressing errors in the debtor name, section 9-506(b)
states: "Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a financing
statement that fails sufficiently to provide the name of the debtor in
accordance with Section 9-503(a) is seriously misleading." This per se
rule is new and might produce a different result in some instances.
The financing statement in this case most likely will be sufficient
by virtue of the section 9-506(c) safe harbor rule. Section 9-506(c)
provides that an erroneous debtor name does not make the financing
statement seriously misleading "[i]f a search of the records of the
filing office under the debtor's correct name, using the filing office's
standard search logic, if any, would disclose" the financing statement.
Many, if not most, of the statewide filing offices use a search logic
with respect to names of organizations (much less uniformity exists
with respect to names of individuals) that ignores organizational
endings such as "Inc." and ignores "The" when it is the first word of
an organization's name. It should be noted that the safe harbor entails
use of the search logic, if any, used by the filing office. The fact that a
wider search logic used by a private search service might have
disclosed an erroneous filing does not bring that financing statement
within the safe harbor. Note also that a filing office may modify its
search logic from time to time; this might have the effect of rendering
undiscoverable (under a search using the correct name) a filing
providing an erroneous name that was previously discoverable.
The statutory safe harbor rule reflects a balance between the
need for some flexibility to allow for human error on the part of filers
(which precludes adoption of a rule requiring absolute perfection in
the presentation of the debtor name, particularly for names of
individuals and organizations other than registered organizations, for
neither of which is there a publicly available official record that might
enable a filer to assure itself of absolute accuracy) and the avoidance
of a rule that would cast an altogether inappropriate burden on
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searchers to have to try to divine potential errors and make searches
under not only the correct name but also "foreseeable" or "likely"
errors that a filer might have made, although some courts, under prior
law, have indicated a misguided willingness to follow such an
approach.2 Using the objective rule of discoverability upon a search
under the correct name also offers the benefit of lessening the need
for litigation.
Q2. Secured party's name, as shown in its corporate charter,
is "The First National City Bank of Oxnard, N.A." It is frequently
referred to in the financial world as "Citybank." The filed financing
statement provides the secured party's name as "Citybank." Is the
financing statement sufficient?
A2. Under section 9-502, one of the three elements of
sufficiency of a financing statement is "the name of the secured party
or a representative of the secured party."3 Section 9-503's specific
rules about name sufficiency, e.g., providing the name of a registered
organization "indicated on the public record of the debtor's
jurisdiction of organization," 4 are applicable only to debtor names.
"Citybank," however, is so far from the correct name of the secured
party that even without that rule, it is clear that the correct name has
not been provided. The effect of this error, however, unlike the
debtor name error discussed in Question 1, is not governed by
sections 9-506(b) and (c), but rather by section 9-506(a). This
provision, intended to provide a margin for error, makes clear that
information provided on the financing statement need not be perfect
and that an error does not ipso facto render a filing insufficient. It sets
as an outer boundary to this permissiveness the "seriously
misleading" rule.
This rule, of course, varies in its meaning depending on the
context, i.e., the nature of the information that is erroneous. Before
dealing with the secured party name error presented in this Question,
it may be useful to consider the different types of information that
might be erroneous. I would divide them into four categories.
The first category is the debtor's name-already considered in
Question 1 and governed by the specific rules of subsections (b) and
(c) of section 9-506. Since this item of information is the key to
2. See, as examples of the approach rejected by Revised Article 9, In re Mines Tire Co.,
194 B.R. 23, 26 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996); and Corporate Financers, Inc. v. Voyageur Trading
Co., 519 N.W.2d 238, 243 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
3. See R. § 9-502(a)(2).
4. Id. § 9-503(a)(1).
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discoverability of the filing, these subsections reflect the crucial
nature of the information and focus on discoverability in setting the
boundaries for permissible error. The second category, at the other
extreme, comprises the items of information that are not even
elements of sufficiency under section 9-502. This category includes
items such as addresses of the parties and the jurisdiction of
organization of the debtor. While these are useful items of
information, section 9-520(c) provides that even if these items are
completely missing, the financing statement is nevertheless effective if
it is filed (although the filing office is supposed to reject a tendered
filing that fails to provide this information'). This point is discussed in
greater depth in connection with subsequent questions. The point for
present purposes is that since the statute declares effective a filed
financing statement where such an item is totally absent, the further
impact of that rule is to render effective a financing statement where
that item is provided but is erroneous, leaving no room for an inquiry
under section 9-506(a). Thus, with respect to this category of
information, the seriously misleading rule simply is not applicable or,
put otherwise, cannot be failed. The third category, indication of
collateral, is one of the elements of sufficiency. 6 It is discussed in
depth four paragraphs below. For purposes of the present analysis,
the seriously misleading rule is effectively displaced by section 9-108
or, put otherwise, the standard in that section of "reasonable
identification" provides the context for what is "seriously misleading"
when the category of information that is under scrutiny is the
collateral indication. The fourth category, the secured party's name, is
the type presented by this Question.
In considering the effect of an error in the secured party name,
both the definition of "secured party" and other provisions of Part 5
dealing with the secured party should be borne in mind. The term
"secured party" is defined to include "a trustee, indenture trustee,
agent, collateral agent, or other representative in whose favor a
security interest ... is created or provided for."'7 Also, the name
requirement provision8 is expanded to encompass a "representative"
(whether or not the representative capacity is indicated on the
financing statementg). These provisions make clear that the true
5. See id. §§ 9-516(b)(4), (b)(5)(a), (b)(5)(C)(ii), 9-520(a).
6. See id. § 9-502(a)(3).
7. Id. § 9-102(a)(72)(E).
8. See id. § 9-502(a)(2).
9. See id. § 9-503(d).
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identity of the person who actually extended credit or the person in
whose favor a security interest was granted need not be disclosed of
record.10 Moreover, putting onto the public record the name of an
assignee of a secured party has never been mandatory and is not an
element of continued perfection." These provisions suggest that great
liberality should be employed in determining the consequences of an
error in the secured party's name. Cases under Former Article 9
recognized that the secured party's name carries far less weight than
that of the debtor, since the latter, not the former, is the key to the
index. 2 Further, and more generally, it should be kept in mind that
the function of the filing system is not to give detailed information
which can be relied on without inquiry of the debtor supplemented by
such further investigation as a prospective secured party may deem
appropriate under the circumstances. Other rules in Part 5 are based
on this premise. 3
Since an error in the secured party name can never preclude
discovery of the financing statement because the index is based on
debtor names, it would be an extraordinarily rare case where an error
in the secured party name could fail the seriously misleading test.
Perhaps a name might be so egregiously wrong and the error of such
a nature that there would be a strong probability that most
reasonable searchers, despite discovery of the filing, would somehow
nevertheless be seriously misled by the error (e.g., despite discovering
the financing statement they would be hampered significantly in
investigating it by reason of the error, posing a substantial risk of
debtor or secured party misconduct). The reasoning that virtually any
erroneous secured party name is nevertheless sufficient does not,
however, compel the conclusion that complete omission of any name
would be acceptable, for this would open the door to possible
manipulation by the debtor. An erroneous name does not present this
risk, and the secured party claiming to be the one entitled to base
perfected status on that particular filing would, of course, have to
10. This rule is in accord with In re Cushman Bakery, 526 F.2d 23, 30 (1st Cir. 1975)
(approving use of nominee). See also In re Fried Furniture Corp., 293 F. Supp. 92, 93 (E.D.N.Y.
1968) (agent); In re Industrial Packaging Prods. Co. v. Fort Pitt Packaging Int'l, Inc., 161 A.2d
19, 21 (Pa. 1960) (agent). In addition, see R. § 9-511, which introduced explicitly the concept of
"secured party of record."
11. See R. §§ 9-310(c), 9-514 (continuing the rules under Former sections 9-302(2) and
9-405).
12. See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Marepcon Fin. Corp (In re Bumper Sales,
Inc.), 907 F.2d 1430, 1435 (4th Cir. 1990); Scot Lad Foods, Inc. v. First Bank & Trust Co., 546
N.E.2d 1168, 1170 (I11. App. Ct. 1989).
13. See, e.g., R. § 9-507(b) (discussed in Question 3).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
present a credible story linking it to the erroneous name.
This liberal approach, however, would not preclude application
of an equitable estoppel in an appropriate case where the secured
party name error actually resulted in prejudice to a particular
searcher that reasonably relied to its detriment on the error and
would be harmed unfairly if the filer who committed the error were
allowed to assert its priority. 14 This approach, supplemented by
estoppel when appropriate, would visit consequences on the party
who committed the error only when required to prevent unfairness,
but would not render the filing ineffective for all purposes. While a
more stringent approach might stimulate filers to exert greater effort
to avoid secured party name errors, filers who commit secured party
name errors should not, as a matter of course, be penalized by
rendering their filings ineffective for all purposes. Even an across-the-
board rule that does not require the existence of a searcher who was
actually harmed would, nevertheless, not avoid litigation, since the
inquiry into the "seriously misleading" nature of the error would still
be necessary. Moreover, employing a rule that imposes a penalty is
not the approach taken generally by the Uniform Commercial Code. 5
Fortunately, most secured parties are likely to get their own names
right.
Although not presented by this Question, it is appropriate to
complete the analysis of section 9-506(a) by including here a brief
discussion of errors in the indication of collateral. Like the secured
party name error, a collateral indication error cannot preclude
discovery of the financing statement. Again, however, since section
9-506(a)'s language does not explicitly limit that rule to debtor name
errors, courts might apply the general "seriously misleading" rule to
errors in the indication of the collateral. In my view, a sound
methodology would begin with section 9-504, which deals directly
with the sufficiency of the indication of collateral in a financing
statement. That section provides that an indication is sufficient if it
provides "(1) a description of the collateral pursuant to Section 9-108;
or (2) an indication that the financing statement covers all assets or all
personal property." Except for use of the blanket "all assets"
indication, this provision, therefore, directs us to section 9-108, which
provides that a description is sufficient if, except as otherwise
provided in other subsections, it "reasonably identifies what is
14. See id. § 9-338 (providing an analogous rule) (discussed in Question 13).
15. See U.C.C. § 1-106(1).
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described. 1 6 Thus, with respect to collateral description, the statute
directs that the focus of analysis be on whether the description meets
the "reasonably identifies" test. In my view, if the description fails to
meet that test, a court should not even consider an argument that,
despite such insufficiency, the financing statement nevertheless may
be effective because the error or omission did not make the financing
statement "seriously misleading." "Reasonable identification" is the
standard provided by the statute for this category of information. This
methodology easily accommodates the classic erroneous serial
number cases. A court should have no difficulty finding that "1996
Bronco VIN 123456789" reasonably identifies the 1996 Bronco whose
VIN is 123457689. Thus, there should be no occasion for application
of the "seriously misleading" test as such to collateral indication
questions.
This Question presents a case involving a trade name used by a
secured party. Section 9-503(c), dealing with the debtor's trade name,
provides that a trade name is neither necessary nor sufficient.
Although this was the rule under Former Article 9 as well, 7 some
courts have gotten this wrong. 18 The intended effect of the debtor
trade name rule is to push secured parties to do what due diligence
and good business practice would dictate anyway: confirm the debtor-
supplied information by examining public records to be sure they
know who the debtor is, what its status is, whether there are
peculiarities in its articles, etc.
Q3. The facts are as in Question 2. Three years after the
financing statement was filed, the debtor approached Lender for a
loan to be secured by certain equipment. Lender discovered
Citybank's filed financing statement by a search under the debtor's
name and tried to contact Citybank, by writing to the mailing address
provided in the financing statement, to determine whether the
particular equipment was actually encumbered. Lender was unable to
do so because the mailing address provided in the financing statement
was a post office box that was no longer operative (Lender's letter to
Citybank was returned marked "Addressee Unknown") and there
was no listing in the telephone book under "Citybank." Lender
makes the secured loan and files a sufficient financing statement,
16. R. § 9-108(a).
17. See U.C.C. § 9-402(7).
18. See, e.g., National Bank v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d
1316, 1321 (5th Cir. 1983); Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793, 796
(5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
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thereby perfecting its security interest. Which security interest,
Citybank's or Lender's, has priority?
A3. If both financing statements are sufficient, the 'first to
file or perfect' rule19 would dictate that Citybank's security interest
has priority. With respect to the name error, assume that, pursuant to
the analysis under Question 2, Citybank's financing statement is
found to be sufficient.
This brings us to the matter of the address provided in the
financing statement. The address provided was Citybank's mailing
address at the time of filing; it became no longer useful only
sometime after the filing. Thus, there was no error. The applicable
rule is found in section 9-507(b), which states: "Except as otherwise
provided in subsection (c) and Section 9-508 [both of which deal with
the debtor name], a financing statement is not rendered ineffective if,
after the financing statement is filed, the information provided in the
financing statement becomes seriously misleading under Section
9-506." The same result should obtain, however, even were we
dealing with an error. The secured party's address is not an element
of sufficiency under section 9-502. Failure to provide an address for
the secured party is a ground for rejection under section 9-516(b)(4),
but if the financing statement is nevertheless accepted by the filing
office, it is effective.20 Since a filed financing statement that lacks a
secured party address would be effective, a filed financing statement
with an erroneous address or an address that was correct when filed
but is no longer correct must surely remain effective. (The answer to
this Question, however, is provided by section 9-507(b) and is not
dependent on logical extrapolation (as is the case with an erroneous
address).) Furthermore, when considering the effect of a secured
party address error, it must be borne in mind that a searcher has no
statutorily protected right to communicate with a secured party. The
duty of a secured party to respond to inquiries is provided in section
9-210 and runs only to the debtor.21
Q4. Which, if any, of the following indications of collateral
on a financing statement is sufficient: (i) "all of Debtor's equipment,"
(ii) "all of Debtor's assets," (iii) "all of Debtor's assets except for
equipment"?
19. See R. § 9-322(a)(1).
20. See id. § 9-520(c).
21. See also the discussion in Question 11 of the effect of an incorrect secured party
address in the context of a purchase money security interest notification.
[Vol. 74:861
1999] TWENTY QUESTIONS ABOUT FILING UNDER REVISED ARTICLE 9 869
A4. All three are sufficient. Analysis begins with section
9-502(a)(3), which provides that a financing statement is sufficient if it
"indicates the collateral covered by the financing statement." Section
9-504 provides that an indication is sufficient if it (1) is a description
sufficient under section 9-108 ("whether or not it is specific, if it
reasonably identifies what is described"2 2) or (2) indicates that all
personal property or all assets are covered. The first of these
alternatives, generally speaking, carries forward prior law (this is true
in principle, but section 9-108 does change the notion of description
somewhat). The second alternative changes the law in those states
where there is caselaw (probably the majority of these) to the effect
that an "all assets" description is inadequate, on the basis that
"everything" does not describe anything or on the basis that
"everything" does not describe the collateral by "item" or "type" (as
required by Former section 9-402).23 It should be noted that an "all
assets" description is not a sufficient description, as a matter of law,
under section 9-108(c), for purposes of a security agreement, despite
its sufficiency in a financing statement. As to the three indications
posited in Question 4: (i) section 9-108(b)(3) expressly renders
sufficient identification by a collateral type defined in the UCC; (ii)
and (iii) are both sufficient by virtue of section 9-504(2); (iii) is simply
a lesser included example of (ii).
Q5. A financing statement filed in January 2002 provided the
following collateral indication: "green 1998 4-door Audi A4." Assume
there is no applicable certificate of title statute. (i) Is this indication
sufficient to perfect a security interest in a blue 1998 4-door Audi A4
bought by Debtor in February 2002? (ii) Would the result in part (i)
be different if the 1998 4-door Audi A4 owned by Debtor at the time
of the filing of the financing statement had been green then but was
painted blue after the filing? (iii) Would the result in part (i) be
different if Debtor is (a) an individual who has never owned more
than one car at a time and that since October 2001, when he bought it,
his only car was a blue 4-door Audi A4, or (b) a dealer who at all
times has an inventory of at least a dozen Audis of various models
and colors?
A5. (i) In the absence of more facts (see part (iii) below), this
indication does not appear to describe ("reasonably identify") the
blue car bought by Debtor after the filing. This Question illustrates
22. R. § 9-108(a).
23. See, e.g., Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Fuqua), 461 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1972).
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the risk of being too specific; better be very sure you have it right if
such specificity is required by the debtor. There are, of course, the
VIN number cases that have excused a single-digit error on the
ground that a vehicle otherwise matching the description and having a
VIN number almost identical to that provided in the financing
statement is adequately described.2 4 On the basis of those cases, the
secured party might argue that the posited description is adequate on
the basis of correct year, make, model, and style, with only color
being incorrect-i.e., that it does "reasonably identify" the collateral.
(ii) Yes, the result would be different. The indication did
describe Debtor's car correctly at the time the financing statement
was filed, albeit perhaps with atypical specificity (putting aside the
use of VIN numbers and other descriptive elements often required
under certificate of title laws). The financing statement was sufficient.
The secured party always has the burden of proof to identify that it is
seeking to enforce against its collateral, so in this case the secured
party would have to prove that the now-blue car was in fact the green
car with a post-filing paint job. Section 9-507(b) makes clear that the
secured party has no duty to monitor with respect to the car's color
and has no duty to amend its financing statement due to the post-
filing change of car color.
(iii) This part of the Question presents the issue, alluded to in
part (i), of whether, at least within reasonable limits, surrounding
facts peculiar to the case may permit a seemingly insufficient
description to reasonably identify the collateral. If external facts are
to be considered, assumption (a) certainly presents a much stronger
case for sufficiency than assumption (b). In light of the different
purposes served by the collateral description in the security
agreement (which conveys property rights, and which like all
contracts, is subject to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intention) and
in the financing statement (which serves only as a warning bell and is,
in most circumstances, not relied on without further investigation), a
looser approach to reading collateral descriptions in financing
statements is justified. Nothing in the text suggests an intent to
change existing law. Estoppel may be the appropriate method to
safeguard against undesirable results in a particular case, without the
necessity to have a stringent approach that renders the financing
statement ineffective for all purposes. Care, however, must be taken
to avoid opening an avenue for after-the-fact manipulation of results
24. See, e.g., Bank of N. Am. v. Bank of Nutley, 227 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967).
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by the debtor."
Q6. Debtor applies for a loan. Bank, advised by its counsel
that pre-filing is advantageous, files the national standard written
(unsigned) form financing statement covering Debtor's inventory and
accounts. (i) Debtor is traveling while Bank is considering the loan
application and preparing the security agreement. Bank's loan officer
calls Debtor to discuss the terms of the loan; Debtor approves Bank's
filing of a financing statement during the telephone conversation. Is
the filed financing statement effective? (ii) Same facts as part (i)
except that Debtor subsequently signs a security agreement covering
inventory and accounts; the security agreement makes no mention of
filing a financing statement. Is the filing effective? (iii) Same facts as
part (ii) except that the security agreement (still silent regarding filing
a financing statement) covers only inventory. (iv) Same facts as part
(ii) except that Debtor finds a better deal elsewhere, never draws on
the loan, and demands that Bank file a termination statement. Is
Debtor entitled to the termination statement? What can Debtor do if
Bank refuses to provide the termination statement?
A6. Before addressing the issues presented by this Question,
it is appropriate to discuss a significant change in practice that will
obtain under the new law-under Revised Article 9, there is no
requirement that the debtor sign a financing statement.26 Now, as
before, the vital element is authorization for the filing.27 This was
implicit under prior law and is now made explicit.28 There is no need,
however, that evidence of authorization be placed on the public
record. The new approach makes clear that the filing office has no
role to play with respect to authorization.29 The sole grounds for
refusal to accept a tendered filing, set forth in section 9-516(b), have
nothing to do with the matter of authorization. Given the facts that:
(1) a filing office has no means of verifying the authenticity of a
purported debtor signature (so the signature requirement could not
effectively guarantee the "integrity" of the public record); (2) the
presence of the signature requirement had not deterred abuse
(usually politically motivated) by filers of so-called "bogus filings";
(3) the presence of the signature requirement had resulted in
inefficiency (and sometimes error, arbitrariness, added cost, and
25. See the discussion in Question 2 concerning collateral description errors.
26. See R. § 9-502 cmt. 3; cf U.C.C. § 9-402(1).
27. See R. § 9-502 cmt. 3.
28. See id. § 9-510(a).
29. See id. § 9-509 cmt. 2.
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delay) in the intake process of certain filing offices (often flowing
from unawareness of the meaning of "signed," defined in unchanged
section 1-201(39), which does not require a blue-ink manually applied
name); and (4) the extra burden on electronic filing that some might
have been tempted to impose were an electronic or "digital"
signature to be required, the Drafting Committee simply eliminated
the requirement that evidence of authorization of the filing be part of
the public record. The requirement that the debtor authorize the
filing of the financing statement, of course, continues. Section
9-509(a)(1) provides that a person may file an initial financing
statement (or an amendment that adds collateral) only if the debtor
authorizes the filing in an authenticated record. Thus, the statute now
makes explicit the same result as would have obtained under Former
Article 9 in the case of the filing of a financing statement on which the
debtor's "signature" was forged-despite having been accepted by
the filing office and become part of the public record, the financing
statement would not have been effective for any purpose. Deletion of
the signature requirement, along with the adoption of medium-
neutral language that does not imply a paper filing, also facilitates
electronic filing (although electronic filing was possible, and in fact
used, under Former Article 930).
The Question presents the issue of effectiveness of a filed
financing statement. Section 9-510(a) provides: "A filed record is
effective only to the extent that it was filed by a person that may file it
under Section 9-509." Section 9-509(a)(1) provides that a person may
file an initial financing statement only if "the debtor authorizes the
filing in an authenticated record." In part (i), the debtor authorized
the filing, but did not do so in an authenticated record. Section
9-102(a)(69) defines "record" to mean "information that is inscribed
on a tangible medium or which is stored in an electronic or other
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." The telephone call
does not qualify as a record.3' Debtor's unrecorded telephonic
consent would not, at least in the absence of more facts, fall within
section 9-102(a)(7)'s definition of "authenticate." "Signing" would,
under unchanged section 1-201(39), require a "writing," apparently
30. See PEB COMMENTARY NO. 15, ELECTRONIC FILING UNDER ARTICLE 9 (1996).
31. A tape recording of the telephone call, however, might well qualify. See Londono v.
City of Gainesville, 768 F.2d 1223, 1227-28 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985) (tape recording as a writing
satisfying the statute of frauds); Ellis Canning Co. v. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp. 1212, 1228 (D.
Colo. 1972); Swink & Co. v. Carroll McEntee & McGinley, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 393, 399 (Ark.
1979); see also PEB COMMENTARY No. 15, supra note 30 (concerning electronic filing under
Former Article 9).
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absent here, and there does not appear to have been any symbol that
Debtor might have adopted with the present intent to identify itself
and adopt or accept a record.
(ii) Section 9-509(b) provides: "By authenticating ... a
security agreement, a debtor ... authorizes the filing of an initial
financing statement, and an amendment, covering: (1) the collateral
described in the security agreement.... " Two further points are
raised by this part of the Question. First, nothing in the statute
requires that the requisite authorization, in the requisite form, exist at
the moment of presentation of the financing statement for filing-the
familiar concept of ratification serves to make the financing statement
fully effective from the time of filing (for purposes of all applicable
rules, such as the priority rule based on time of filing). Second, the
rule of section 9-509(b) is not contingent on the express mention of
authorization in the security agreement-the statute makes authoriza-
tion an automatic consequence of the debtor's authentication of a
security agreement.
(iii) This part of the Question brings out the point that such
automatic authorization extends only to the collateral covered in the
security agreement. Thus, there was neither automatic authorization
nor authorization evidenced by an authenticated record with respect
to a filing covering accounts. The filing, of course, is authorized and
effective with respect to inventory and proceeds thereof.3 2 It must be
kept in mind that a financing statement is not a "document" (even
when embodied in a paper record) that stands or falls in its entirety;
the financing statement is an aggregation of data meeting the
sufficiency requirements of section 9-502. "Financing statement" is
defined in section 9-102(a)(39) simply as a record, and there are no
requirements of form that go to sufficiency or effectiveness.
(iv) This part of the Question presents the issue of when a
person named as a debtor on a filed financing statement is entitled to
obtain a termination statement from the secured party. Since the
collateral is inventory, it is not consumer goods, and the parties' rights
and obligation are governed by section 9-513(c), not subsection (a).
The secured party is obligated, within twenty days after the secured
party receives an authenticated demand from the debtor, to send the
debtor or file directly a termination statement when there is neither
an outstanding secured obligation nor a commitment to give value.33
32. See R. § 9-509(b).
33. See id. § 9 -513(c)(1).
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If the secured party fails to fulfill that obligation, the debtor may file a
termination statement itself.34 Section 9-510(a) provides that a filing is
effective to the extent it was filed by a person entitled to file it under
section 9-509. Section 9-509(d)(2) provides that a person (including
the debtor) may file a termination statement for a financing statement
as to which the secured party failed to perform the obligation
imposed under section 9-513, provided (as conditions to the
effectiveness of the termination statement) that the debtor authorizes
the filing and that the termination statement indicates that the debtor
authorized it to be filed. The latter proviso enables subsequent
searchers to discern that the debtor has filed the termination
statement claiming entitlement to do so pursuant to this section-
additional information that will no doubt provoke further inquiry by a
prudent searcher. Unless circumstances suggest a contrary course, a
prudent searcher will, in all events, likely investigate all filed
financing statements, even those whose effectiveness appears to be
terminated by filed termination statements. In addition to the right to
file an effective termination statement, if the debtor has been harmed
by the secured party's failure to perform its section 9-513 obligation,
the debtor is entitled to compensatory damages under section
9-625(b) and statutory damages under section 9-625(e)(4).
Q7. Bank A, which acts in California through Straw Man, is
considering Debtor's application for a secured inventory loan. Bank
A will provide the funds advanced and ultimately will reap the
income or suffer any loss that is produced by the loan, but the security
agreement and other loan documents run in favor of Straw Man,
which will administer the loan. In preparation for the loan, a
financing statement is filed. (a) Which, if any, of the following
financing statements is sufficient? (i) financing statement identifying
"Bank A" as secured party. (ii) financing statement identifying
"Straw Man" as secured party. (iii) financing statement identifying
secured party as "Straw Man acting as agent for Bank A." (iv)
financing statement identifying secured party as "Straw Man, as
Agent." (b) With respect to each of the financing statements listed in
part (a), assuming it was filed, who may file an amendment?
A7. Section 9-502 requires for sufficiency that a financing
statement provide the "name of the secured party or a representative
of the secured party."35 The definition of "secured party" includes "a
34. See id. § 9-509(d)(2).
35. Id. § 9-502(a)(2).
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trustee, indenture trustee, agent, collateral agent, or other
representative in whose favor a security interest ... is created or
provided for. '36 Thus, the secured party is the person in whose favor
the security agreement provides for a security interest, whether that
person is the actual creditor or an agent for the actual creditor.
Therefore, in part (i), the financing statement identifying Bank A
would not appear to be sufficient because the security agreement did
not run in its favor. It might be argued, however, that under the law
of agency, extrinsic to Article 9, but incorporated under section 1-103,
Bank A is nevertheless the secured party, as Straw Man's undisclosed
principal. This approach does not fit the statutory construct neatly,
however, and might have unintended consequences. Perhaps this
might better be dealt with as a name error.37
In part (ii), however, the financing statement identifying Straw
Man is sufficient, whether Straw Man or Bank A is the grantee of the
security interest under the loan documents. If Straw Man is the
grantee, it is obviously the secured party. If Bank A is the grantee,
identification on the financing statement of Straw Man is nevertheless
sufficient because Straw Man is Bank A's representative. Section
9-503(d) provides: "Failure to indicate the representative capacity of
a secured party or representative of a secured party does not affect
the sufficiency of a financing statement."
The financing statements in parts (iii) and (iv) are clearly
sufficient under all hypotheses -nothing in Article 9 requires
disclosure of either representative capacity or the identity of the
principal.38
Part (b) of the question introduces the subject of amendments.
This term embraces all filings subsequent to the initial financing
statement, all of which in some fashion alter the state of the record.39
Again, we must look to section 9-509 to determine who may file an
amendment, since under section 9-510 a filed record is effective only
to the extent it is filed by someone entitled to file it.40 Assuming that
this Question does not involve an amendment that either adds
collateral or a debtor not previously covered (which would require
authorization by the debtor), 41 and also does not involve a
36. Id. § 9-102(a)(72)(E).
37. See the discussion in Question 2.
38. See R. § 9-503(d).
39. See id. § 9-512.
40. See id. § 9-510(a).
41. See id. § 9-509(a).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
termination statement filed by the debtor after failure by a secured
party to file a termination statement when obligated to do so, other
types of amendments are effective, pursuant to section 9-509(d), only
if the "secured party of record" authorizes the filing.
This concept is dealt with in section 9-511, which provides that
the secured party of record is the person named as the secured party
or the representative of the secured party in the initial financing
statement (as may be subsequently modified by filed amendment,
including amendments that assign of record the power to affect the
record42). Thus, under section 9-509(c), it is the person identified on
the record as the secured party or its representative that is the person
who may authorize (and, thus, render effective) subsequent filings.
An example of the significance of the distinction between the secured
party and the secured party of record is found in the provision
concerning the obligation of the secured party to provide a
termination statement under section 9-513. The secured party is the
person obligated, but the obligation is stated in terms of "caus[ing]
the secured party of record" to send or file the termination
statement,43 since the secured party of record, not the secured party, is
the only one with the power to authorize the filing of the termination
statement. This illustration also makes the point that a secured party
who elects to act by means of a third party secured party of record
should select its agent prudently. In the problems posed, Bank A is
the secured party of record in part (i) and Straw Man is the secured
party of record in parts (ii)-(iv).
Q8. Bank A and Bank B made a $1,000,000 loan to Debtor,
secured pursuant to a security agreement providing for a security
interest in favor of both banks; each bank advanced half the loan
funds. (a) Are both banks' security interests perfected if (i) the filed
financing statement identified the secured party as "Bank A"? (ii) the
filed financing statement identified as secured parties "Bank A" and
"Bank B"? (b) Bank A agrees to release its security interest in some
of the collateral and Bank A files an amendment deleting that
collateral. Under each alternative, what consequence to Bank B?
A8. In part (a), under the facts of alternative (i), the security
interests of both banks are perfected, for the reasons discussed in
Question 7, assuming that between them the banks have agreed
(however informally) that Bank A will serve as Bank B's
42. See id. § 9-514(b).
43. See id. § 9-513(c).
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representative for purposes of the public record. Ordinary agency
principles will govern their relationship. Agency for all purposes is
not required; agency for the limited purpose of dealing with the
public record is sufficient. Based on the statutory provisions discussed
in Question 7, the identification of Bank A is sufficient to perfect for
Bank B as well.
Under the facts of alternative (ii), each of the banks has been
identified in its own right and clearly the financing statement has
satisfied section 9-502(a)(2). Section 9-503(e) expressly validates the
provision of more than one secured party name on a financing
statement.
Turning to part (b), under alternative (i), Bank A has effectively
released its security interest in the collateral described in the
amendment and terminated the effectiveness of the financing
statement to perfect that interest. As Bank A is the sole secured party
of record, Bank A's filing of the amendment also has the effect of
terminating the effectiveness of the financing statement to perfect the
security interest of Bank B in the deleted collateral." Bank A had the
statutory authority effectively to file the termination statement and
thereby change the legal effect of the public record, even if it lacked
actual authority under ordinary agency law. This again points up the
need for caution in selecting a representative to act as secured party
of record.
Under the facts of alternative (ii), however, both Bank A and
Bank B are secured parties of record (and presumably there has been
no agency agreement between them). Section 9-509(d) permits each
of multiple secured parties of record to authorize the filing of an
amendment (precluding filing offices from requiring all secured
parties of record to join in an amendment). The filing by Bank A,
however, does not affect Bank B's security interest because, under
section 9-510(b), "[a] record authorized by one secured party of
record does not affect the financing statement with respect to another
secured party of record." Thus, in the absence of off-record authori-
zation from Bank B empowering Bank A to affect the record in its
behalf, Bank B will not be affected by Bank A's filing.
Q9. Lender, holding a security interest, presents for filing a
financing statement that fails to provide a name for the secured party.
44. Had Bank B also been a secured party of record, the filing of the amendment would
not have affected the financing statement with respect to Bank B. See id. § 9-510(b). This is
illustrated in alternative (ii), discussed below.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
(i) Assuming it complies with its statutory obligations, will the filing
office reject the financing statement? (ii) If the filing office rejects the
tendered financing statement, is the security interest perfected? (iii) If
the filing office accepts the tendered financing statement, is the
security interest perfected?
A9. Section 9-516(a) continues the former rule 45 to the effect
that filing occurs if a record is communicated to the filing office with a
tender of the filing fee or acceptance of the record by the filing office;
however, subsection (b) provides that filing does not occur if the filing
office refuses to accept a record for any of the enumerated reasons.
This section must be read together with section 9-520(a), which
requires the filing office to refuse acceptance for, and only for, the
reasons enumerated in section 9-516.
Subsection (b)(4) states as a ground for rejection the failure of an
initial financing statement to provide a name for the secured party of
record. Thus, the filing office is obliged to refuse to accept the
tendered financing statement. If it properly rejects the financing
statement, filing has not occurred and the security interest is not
perfected. If the filing office improperly accepts the tendered
financing statement, filing does occur, pursuant to section 9-516(a).
The financing statement, however, even though it is filed, is not
effective and, thus, does not perfect the security interest, because it is
not sufficient under section 9-502, which makes a secured party name
an element of sufficiency. 46
Q10. Same facts as Question 9 except that the item lacking in
the tendered financing statement is a mailing address for the debtor.
Same questions as Question 9.
A10. The answers to parts (i) and (ii) are the same as in
Question 9. Section 9-516(b)(5)(A) lists failure to provide a mailing
address for the debtor as a ground for rejection. Thus, the filing office
is obliged to reject the financing statement and if it does reject, filing
does not occur. If, however, the financing statement is improperly
accepted, filing does occur and, in this case, it is effective to perfect.
This is because under section 9-520(c), a filed financing statement
that satisfies the sufficiency elements of section 9-502(a) is effective
"even if the filing office is required to refuse to accept it for filing."
This important rule effectuates the policy of making effective
filings that, albeit intended to be kept off the record by the rejection
45. See U.C.C. § 9-403(1).
46. See R. § 9-502(a)(2).
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screen mandated on the filing office, nevertheless actually do get on
the record and, having at least met the requirements of sufficiency,
can perform the Article 9 function of giving notice to searchers.
Information such as the debtor's mailing address may be helpful in
distinguishing between debtors having the same name, but that
information is not a search criterion that might preclude discovery of
the financing statement. There is, of course, a balancing of competing
interests reflected in this approach. In the case of a very common
individual debtor name, against which there might, in a populous
state, be hundreds of filings, having distinguishing additional items of
information would be a helpful screen to lessen the burden of
investigation. On the other hand, making the presence and
correctness of this information a condition to effectiveness of the
filing would impose a substantial risk of loss on secured parties whose
filings are nevertheless discoverable in instances where no prejudice
at all is suffered by a searcher and where nonreliance creditors would
derive a windfall benefit. The relative unimportance of the debtor's
address is also demonstrated by the fact that the obligation to correct
on the record post-filing changes in information is limited to
situations involving the debtor's name.47
Ql. Bank holds a security interest in Debtor's existing and
after-acquired inventory. Bank's filed financing statement provides an
erroneous address for itself. Subsequent to the Bank's filing, Seller,
intending to sell inventory to Debtor on secured credit, retained a
security interest and timely filed its own financing statement,
searched the files, and sent a notification under section 9-324(b) to
Bank at the address provided in Bank's financing statement. The
notification never reached Bank. (i) Is Bank's security interest
perfected? (ii) Does Bank's security interest have priority over that of
Seller? (iii) Would the results in parts (i) and (ii) be different if the
error were in Bank's name rather than its address?
All. Part (i) differs from Question 10, where the financing
statement lacked a debtor address; here, the problem is with the
secured party's address and it is not lacking but rather is erroneous.
The filing office cannot serve as a screening device with respect to this
problem since it has no way of knowing whether a given address is
correct or incorrect. Addresses (of either debtor or secured party) are
not elements of sufficiency under section 9-502; they are, however,
47. See id. § 9-507(b)-(c).
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elements that if lacking would constitute grounds for rejection.48 Even
were the error rule of section 9-506 applicable to items that are not
elements of sufficiency, 49 addresses are not search criteria, so it is hard
to imagine a case where an address error can be "seriously
misleading" in such a general sense that the consequence should be
ineffectiveness for all purposes. This does not mean, however, that
the error may never have consequences, merely that the error will not
render the financing statement ineffective to perfect. Under
appropriate circumstances, an estoppel might be justified to protect a
particular searcher who was misled and is deserving of protection.
Bank's security interest is perfected.
Under the 'first to file or perfect' rule, Bank would have priority.
Seller, however, asserts purchase money superpriority. Under section
9-324(b), not only must Seller send its notification to Bank, but Bank
must also receive it.5o In this case, Bank did not physically receive the
notification because it had provided an incorrect address for itself.
Seller did "send" the notification in that, under section
9-102(a)(74)(A), using "any address reasonable under the
circumstances" satisfies the definition. It certainly was reasonable for
the Seller to rely on the address provided on the public record by
Bank. Bank "received" the notification because, under section
1-201(26)(b), a person receives a notification when it is duly delivered
at any "place held out by him as the place for receipt of such
communications."51
Part (iii), where Bank's name rather than address was incorrect,
differs from Question 9, where the secured party's name was
altogether lacking; here, it was provided but was incorrect. Again, the
filing office cannot in such circumstances perform a screening
function, so the financing statement gets on the record despite the
name error. Unlike part (i), however, the secured party name is an
element of sufficiency under section 9-502(a)(2). Section 9-503, which
offers some guidance in connection with debtor names, is not
applicable. Thus, we might fall back on section 9-506-the "seriously
misleading" rule.52 An easier solution is available, however. Although
Bank's error prevented physical receipt of the notification sent by
Seller, it is most likely that Seller, as in part (ii), did satisfy the
48. See id. § 9-516(b)(4), (b)(5)(A).
49. See the discussion in Question 2.
50. See R. § 9-324(b)(2)-(3).
51. See id. § 9-516 cmt. 5.
52. See the discussion in Question 2.
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requirements of section 9-324. Even if the name error for some
reason does not fit neatly within the "send" and "receive" definitions
discussed above, however, a court would likely estop Bank from
asserting its priority vis-A-vis Seller, who was prejudiced by Bank's
error.
Q12. Secured party filed a financing statement on a
nonstandard written form. In the space for the debtor's name, the
secured party typed "Elton John." Elton John is the debtor's correct
name. (i) Assuming it complies with its statutory obligation, will the
filing office refuse to accept the financing statement? (ii) If the filing
office rejects the financing statement, is the security interest
perfected? (iii) If the filing office accepts the financing statement, is
the security interest perfected?
A12. The filing office will refuse to accept the financing
statement on either of two grounds: section 9-516(b)(5)(B) requires
that the financing statement "indicate whether the debtor is an
individual or an organization" or, if it does indicate that the debtor is
an individual, section 9-516(b)(3)(C) requires that such a financing
statement identify the debtor's last name.
These, and the other refusal criteria specified in section 9-516,
are designed to make the filing office intake and indexing tasks more
efficient, make the database more accessible, and allocate to filers,
not filing office personnel, the task of providing the required data in a
way that facilitates those goals. Search logic for organization names
differs from that for individual names, and individual names are
searched under the last name. Designation of the nature of this data
should be the responsibility of the filer, and the filing office personnel
should not be required (or permitted) to make determinations of this
sort. Electronic filing produces these results automatically, With a
view to achieving these results even when written (paper) forms are
used, national standard forms satisfying the requirements of Revised
Article 9 were developed and put into the statute. Relying on
practicality rather than coercion to encourage their use, the statute
does not make their use mandatory. Section 9-521, however, does
prohibit filing offices from refusing to accept them on the basis of
form.53
Returning to the problem presented in Question 12, the national
53. The predecessor transition period forms, on which the statutory forms were based, are
explained in detail in Harry C. Sigman, Putting Uniformity into-and Improving the Operation
of-the Uniform Commercial Code: The New National Financing Statement Form, 51 BUS. LAW.
721 (1996).
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standard written form would have satisfied both of the above-
mentioned requirements as it provides separate debtor name boxes
for individuals and organizations, and it provides separate boxes for
an individual's first and last names. Thus, filling in that form
automatically would have complied with these requirements. A
nonstandard form was used, however. If the filing office properly
refuses to accept the financing statement, filing does not occur and
the security interest is not perfected. If the filing office improperly
accepts the financing statement, filing has occurred and, if the
financing statement is otherwise sufficient, it is effective under section
9-520(c). If the financing statement was indexed under Elton, rather
than under John, however, it would obviously be undiscoverable.
That is the reason section 9-516 requires the filing office to refuse to
accept the tendered financing statement when the filer fails to specify
the last name of an individual debtor.5 4
Q13. D Corp., a California corporation, gave a security
interest in its existing and after-acquired inventory and accounts to
Financer. Financer presents for filing a financing statement that
indicates Nevada as D Corp.'s state of organization. (i) The Nevada
filing office rejects because it knows, from the corporate identification
number given on the financing statement, that the information about
the debtor's state of organization is incorrect. Is the financing
statement effective to perfect Financer's security interest? (ii) The
California filing office rejects because the financing statement
indicates that D Corp. was organized in Nevada. Is the financing
statement effective to perfect Financer's security interest? (iii) The
California filing office accepts and files the financing statement. D
Corp. approaches Bank for financing and Bank sends the California
filing office a search request. In response thereto, the listing shows
Financer's financing statement. Bank, however, ignores that financing
statement because it is looking for filings against the D Corp. that is a
California corporation, not corporations organized elsewhere that
happen to have the same name. Bank takes a security interest in D
Corp.'s existing and after-acquired inventory and accounts, files an
effective financing statement in California, and advances funds.
Which security interest, Financer's or Bank's, has priority as to the
inventory?
A13. (i) The refusal by the Nevada filing office to accept
Financer's financing statement was not authorized under the statute;
54. See Question 14 for a discussion of misindexing.
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it was not based on any of the grounds for refusal enumerated in
section 9-516(b). Nothing in the Code authorizes the filing office to
inquire into or consider the accuracy or correctness of any
information provided in a record presented for filing.55 Section
9-520(a) makes clear that a filing office may not refuse to accept a
record on any ground other than those enumerated in section
9-516(b). Financer's financing statement was communicated to the
Nevada filing office and the filing fee was tendered, so, despite the
wrongful rejection, the financing statement is effective as a filed
record. 56 It will probably do Financer no good, however, because,
under section 9-301(1), the debtor's location is the proper state in
which to file, and, under section 9-307(e), the location of a registered
organization is the state in which it is organized.
(ii) Turning to the rejection by the California filing office,
the analysis presented above indicates the wrongfulness of the
rejection and the consequent filing notwithstanding the wrongful
rejection. Now, however, the filing is in the right state. Thus, the
financing statement is effective to perfect Financer's security interest.
(iii) The erroneousness of the information about the state of
organization does not render the financing statement undiscoverable.
In fact, it was reported by the California filing office in response to a
search request. Because this case involves information described in
section 9-516(b)(5) that was incorrect at the time the financing
statement was filed, section 9-520(c) makes section 9-338 applicable.
Under section 9-338(1), Financer's security interest is subordinate to
that of Bank to the extent that Bank gave value in reasonable reliance
upon the incorrect information. It is likely that a court would find
Bank behaved reasonably in not investigating Financer's financing
statement, especially if D Corp. is a common name and there might
well be numerous filings listed against D Corps. that are organized
elsewhere than in California. Since the vulnerability of the filing
secured party is already very limited-no risk of ineffectiveness, just
of subordination, and then only to a very small class of persons who
actually searched the public record, actually found the financing
statement, and actually relied on the erroneous information-the
courts ought not erect much of an additional barrier by a rigorous
application of the reasonableness of the reliance. Section 9-338 is a
rule designed to protect reliance competitors who are actually
55. See R. § 9-516 cmt. 3.
56. See id. § 9-516(d).
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prejudiced by the secured party's error, while at the same time not
placing an undue burden on all transactions (and inappropriate risk of
loss on all secured parties), since this particular category of
information (while helpful to searchers in some contexts) is rarely
likely to be pivotal.
Q14. Bank obtained a security interest and filed a financing
statement correctly identifying "Weise, Steven 0." as the debtor. The
filing office, however, misindexes it under "Weiss, Steven 0." (i) Is
Bank's security interest perfected? (ii) In response to a later search
request from Financer under the debtor's correct name, the filing
office reports that no financing statements are on file against that
debtor. Financer perfects a security interest and advances funds.
Which security interest, Bank's or Financer's, has priority? What, if
anything, could the losing party have done to avoid the loss?
A14. Bank's security interest is perfected. Section 9-517,
carrying forward the rule under Former section 9-401, provides that
the "failure of a filing office to index a record correctly does not affect
the effectiveness of the record." Bank's security interest has priority
under the 'first to file or perfect' rule. Financer could have done
nothing more, in terms of the public record, than it did; it searched
under the correct debtor name. Bank, of course, could have
discovered the misindexing by conducting a post-filing search, a
practice, followed by some secured parties. The statute does not
require this, however, because errors are relatively rare and it would
make no sense to require, by putting the opposite rule into effect,
every filing of a financing statement to be followed by a post-filing
search. Besides adding to the cost of every secured financing, this
inundation would require the reallocation of scarce filing office
resources and would likely impede prompt and accurate filing office
intake processing, indexing, and searching. The advent of free remote
access electronic searching of computerized indices might suggest
reconsideration of this rule.
Q15. The filing office received in the mail a financing
statement naming Duncan as debtor and Firstbank as secured party,
covering Duncan's inventory and accounts. In the course of
processing the financing statement in the filing office, the financing
statement is accidentally stapled to another financing statement
naming someone else as debtor. Consequently, Firstbank's financing
statement is never fully processed and never entered into the index.
(i) Is Firstbank's financing statement effective? (ii) In response to
Credit Union's search request under Duncan's correct name, the
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filing office reports that there are no financing statements on file
naming Duncan as debtor. Credit Union obtains a security interest in
Duncan's inventory and accounts, files an effective financing
statement, and advances funds. Which security interest, Firstbank's or
Credit Union's, has priority? What, if anything, could the losing party
have done to avoid the loss?
A15. Firstbank, as in Question 14, made an effective filing and
its security interest was perfected and has priority under the 'first to
file or perfect' rule. Assume that Firstbank's check was processed and
that Firstbank did not request an acknowledgement of the filing; it
would have had no reason to even suspect the existence of a problem.
Nothing obliges a filer to request an acknowledgement. Under section
9-523(b), the filing office is required to acknowledge all filings
presented other than by means of a written record (e.g.,
electronically), but under subsection (a), an acknowledgment of the
filing of a written record is required only if it is requested by the filer.
If Firstbank had requested and failed to receive an acknowledgement
of its filing, one might argue that it was put on notice that something
went awry and it should have followed up. On the other hand,
particularly in the case, for example, of a small seller who only
occasionally sells on a secured basis and acts without counsel, a
failure to discover the error for lack of an effective follow-up system
should not ordinarily result in loss of perfection. Nothing in the Code
expressly requires such due diligence, and adoption of a rule of
automatic subordination for failure to follow up on each failure to
receive a requested acknowledgement would be counterproductive.
Even an institutional lender might not be expected to track all filings
for which it does not receive a notification of rejection, particularly
since under section 9-520(b) filing offices are now expressly obliged to
promptly communicate the "fact of and reason for the refusal." In this
case, we did not have a refusal to accept but rather something more
akin to a misindexing, although likely in this case the financing
statement never got indexed at all. Generally, Part 5 puts the risk of
loss due to filing office error on the later party, rather than on the
secured party who properly communicates a sufficient record to the
filing office, and courts should be extremely cautious about using
estoppel to undermine the certainty and efficiency provided by this
approach. There was nothing Credit Union could have done to avoid
the loss.
Q16. The filing office received a financing statement in written
form, with debtor A's name correctly presented but debtor B's name
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scribbled illegibly. Is the financing statement effective with respect to
either, both, or neither debtor? Does the answer depend on what the
filing office does with it? What is the filing office supposed to do with
it?
A16. Section 9-503(e) states that a financing statement may
provide the name of more than one debtor, and section 9-520(d)
states that, in such a case, Part 5 "applies as to each debtor
separately." As to A there is no problem; therefore, the filing office
may not refuse to accept the financing statement as to A, and the
financing statement is effective as to A. As to B, the illegibility
constitutes a ground for refusal to accept. Section 9-516(c)(1)
provides that "a record does not provide information if the filing
office is unable to read or decipher the information." Thus, no debtor
name was provided as to B, requiring rejection 57 and precluding an
effective filing as to B. Thus, the financing statement should be
accepted as to A and rejected as to B.
The foregoing answers as to effectiveness do not depend on what
the filing office does. If it improperly rejects the financing statement
as to A, it is nevertheless effective, and if the filing office improperly
accepts the financing statement as to B (hard to imagine because it
would be impossible to index a name that is illegible), the financing
statement would still be ineffective-unless the filing office, treating
the name as legible enough to index it, came up with a name so close
that, treated as an erroneous name under the rules discussed in
Question 1 above, it was not "seriously misleading."
Q17. Lender filed a financing statement on July 24, 2001. Four
years later, on July 24, 2005, Lender filed a continuation statement.
(a) When does the effectiveness of the financing statement lapse?
Does the answer depend on what the filing office does with the
continuation statement? What is the filing office supposed to do with
it? (b) Would any of the foregoing answers be different if Lender had
filed the continuation statement on July 31, 2006?
A17. The effectiveness of the financing statement lapses on
July 24, 2006. The continuation statement was filed prematurely, prior
to the commencement of the permitted filing period. Section
9-515(d), continuing the rule under prior law,58 states: "A
continuation statement may be filed only within six months before the
expiration of the five-year period .... " Section 9-515(e) provides that
57. See id. § 9-516(b)(3)(A).
58. See U.C.C. § 9-403(3).
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effectiveness of an initial financing statement continues "upon timely
filing of a continuation statement," and section 9-515(c) provides that
the "effectiveness of a filed financing statement lapses on the
expiration of the period of its effectiveness unless before the lapse a
continuation statement is filed pursuant to subsection (d)." Thus,
even if the filing office accepts the continuation statement, it is not
effective to extend the duration of the effectiveness of the financing
statement. Section 9-516(b)(7) obliges the filing office to refuse to
accept a continuation statement "not filed within the six-month
period prescribed by Section 9-515(d)."
(b) The statutory provisions make no distinction between
premature and tardy presentations of continuation statements; both
are required to be rejected and neither is effective even if accepted.
It should be noted that receipt by the filing office of a timely filed
continuation statement is one of the few circumstances when the
filing of an amendment triggers filing office action other than simply
adding the filed record to the files. On receipt of other types of
amendments, the filing office simply adds the amendment to the
public record (in some cases also adding information, such as, for
example, adding an additional secured party name by reason of a
partial assignment, or adding (but not substituting) a changed debtor
name), but does not delete anything from the public record and
otherwise takes no action. In the case of a timely filed continuation
statement, the filing office takes action based on the filing-it extends
the lapse date, thereby deferring any purge program that would
otherwise delete the financing statement.
Section 9-522(a) requires the filing office to "maintain a record
of the information provided in a filed financing statement for at least
one year after the effectiveness of the financing statement has lapsed
... with respect to all secured parties of record." Section 9-519(g)
prohibits the filing office from removing "a debtor's name from the
index until one year after the effectiveness of a financing statement
naming the debtor lapses ... with respect to all secured parties of
record." Thus, it is lapse that triggers the possibility of deletion (and,
thus, discoverability) and the continuation statement defers lapse.
The overall filing system provided for under Revised Article 9,
despite the deletion of the requirement of signatures on filings and
because of a more limited and more clearly defined role of the filing
office, results in a more efficient, reliable, and uniform system in
which searchers get more information and the interests of all users
are better-served.
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As is the case with all tendered records, the filing office has no
way of knowing in whose behalf a record is tendered, whether the
filing is authorized, and whether it was tendered by mistake. In the
case of a wrongfully accepted (or mistakenly filed) continuation
statement, the worst that can happen is that a financing statement
that actually lapsed appears to have been continued, thus deferring
the potential deletion date-it continues to be discoverable. Contrast
this situation with a termination statement tendered by mistake or by
a miscreant debtor. Under former law, the filing office would have,
immediately upon receipt of the termination statement, deleted the
financing statement from its active files and ceased reporting it to
searchers. 9 While this should not (except perhaps in the case of a
termination sent by the secured party by mistake6°) result in the de-
perfection of the security interest, it would at the very least have
resulted in litigation with any subsequent filers (or a trustee in
bankruptcy). Under Revised Article 9, the filing office does not
delete anything from the public record upon receipt of a termination
statement; instead, that filing is simply added to the record and
reported to subsequent searchers. Under Revised Article 9, the filing
office is taken out of the business of making determinations
concerning the effect of a filing, and searchers get more information.
Q18. On November 19, 2001, Debtor and Financer entered
into a written agreement for the sale of all Debtor's existing and
future accounts. A financing statement was filed on that day, but no
continuation statement was filed subsequently. On November 1, 2006,
LC, a creditor of Debtor, acquired a judicial lien on two of the sold
accounts. (i) On November 1, 2006, who has the senior claim to the
two accounts, LC or Financer? (ii) On November 15, 2006, the
account debtor on Account #1 paid to Financer the amount due on
the account. Who has the senior claim to the payment, LC or
Financer? (iii) On December 1, 2006, who has the senior claim to
Account #2, LC or Financer? (iv) On December 12, 2006, the account
debtor on Account #2 paid to Financer the amount due on the
account. Who has the senior claim to the payment, LC or Financer?
A18. (i) On November 1, 2006, Financer, not Debtor, owned
the accounts. Nevertheless, Article 9 is applicable pursuant to section
9-109(a)(3), and the definition of "security interest" in section
59. UCC section 9-407(2) provided for reporting of "presently effective" financing
statements. Cf R. § 9-523.
60. See, e.g., Crestar Bank v. Neal (In re Kitchin Equip. Co.), 960 F.2d 1242 (4th Cir. 1992).
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1-201(37) includes the interest of a buyer of accounts. Section
9-318(a), in an effort to make clear that Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v.
Rimmer,61 does not take the desired approach,62 expressly states that
the seller of accounts does not retain any legal or equitable interest in
the sold accounts. Section 9-318(b), however, provides:
For purposes of determining the rights of creditors of, and
purchasers for value of an account or chattel paper from, a debtor
that has sold an account or chattel paper, while the buyer's security
interest is unperfected, the debtor is deemed to have rights and title
to the account or chattel paper identical to those the debtor sold.
On November 1, 2006, Financer's interest was perfected by a still
effective filing. On that date, therefore, Debtor had no interest in the
accounts and the levy caught nothing. Financer has the senior claim.
(ii) On November 15, 2006, Financer was still perfected and
it had priority in the payment, the proceeds of the account as to which
it had priority on that date as well. Since Debtor had no interest in
the payment, the levy didn't catch that either. (iii) On December 1,
2006, the effectiveness of Financer's financing statement has lapsed.
The consequences of lapse are provided in section 9-515(c).
Retroactive effect of lapse is not provided vis-A-vis anyone other than
a purchaser. Hence, even on December 1, 2006, despite the lapse,
Financer prevails over LC, whose claim is based on a pre-lapse levy.
This answer might vary depending on the nature of a judicial lien in a
particular state-if under local law it is effective as a continuing levy,
i.e., treated as a fresh levy each day, LC would prevail, although not
based on retroactivity of the lapse, but rather on the basis that it
levied after lapse; on that basis, LC would prevail under section
9-317(a)(2). (iv) Same answer as part (iii), assuming that under the
local law of the state in question LC's judicial lien on the account
reaches the payment by the account debtor.
019. On November 19, 2001, Debtor and Financer entered
into a written agreement for the sale of all Debtor's existing and
future accounts. A financing statement was filed on that day, but no
continuation statement was filed subsequently. On November 1, 2006,
Factor bought two of the sold accounts from Debtor and filed a
financing statement against Debtor covering the two accounts. (i) On
November 1, 2006, who has the senior claim to the two accounts,
Financer or Factor? (ii) On November 15, 2006, the account debtor
on Account #1 paid to Financer the amount due on the account. Who
61. 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993).
62. See PEB COMMENTARY NO. 14, ELECTRONIC FILING UNDER ARTICLE 9 (1996).
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has the senior claim to the payment, Financer or Factor? (iii) On
December 1, 2006, who has the senior claim to Account #2, Financer
or Factor? (iv) On December 1, 2006, who has the senior claim to the
November 15 payment made on Account #1, Financer or Factor? (v)
On December 12, 2006, the account debtor on Account #2 paid to
Financer the amount due on the account. Who has the senior claim to
the payment, Financer or Factor?
A19. - (i) Same analysis as for part (i) of Question 18. As
Debtor had nothing to sell to Factor, Financer has the senior-only-
claim to the two accounts. (ii) Again, same analysis as for part (ii) of
Question 18. Financer owned the account free of any interest therein
of Debtor, who had thus sold nothing to Factor. The same, therefore,
holds true for the payment on the account.
(iii) At this point in time, Financer's security interest in
Account #2 has lapsed. Thus, under section 9-318(b), Debtor is
deemed to have rights identical to those it had previously sold,
meaning ownership of Account #2, including the power to sell it
again. Section 9-515(c) provides that the effect of the lapse of the
effectiveness of Financer's financing statement is retroactive as
against a purchaser for value; that is, Financer's security interest not
only became unperfected on the lapse date but is "deemed never to
have been perfected" as against Factor.
(iv) The fact that the effectiveness of Financer's financing
statement has lapsed after it collected and applied the payment on
Account #1 should make no difference. That payment has discharged
both Financer's security interest and that of subordinate interests
therein and from that moment on ceased to be collateral as to which
Article 9 was applicable. The subsequent loss of perfection, even if
retroactive as to property that continued to be collateral, should not
enable Factor to force the disgorgement of payments received by
Financer at a time when Financer was perfected.
(v) Even if Financer is at this point in time junior with
respect to Account #2 (as concluded in part (iii)), Financer might
nevertheless prevail with respect to the payment on that account from
the account debtor. Presumably the account debtor paid the amount
due on the account by means of a check, a negotiable instrument.
Under section 9-331, successor provision to Former section 9-309,
Article 9 does not limit the rights of a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument, and the filing of a financing statement does
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not give notice of a claim to such a holder. 63 Factor's filed financing
statement does not of itself constitute notice to Financer sufficient to
deprive it of holder in due course status. The definition of good faith,
found in section 9-102(a)(43), now includes, in addition to honesty in
fact, the objective component of "the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing." There would not appear to be
any question of Financer's good faith, as there is certainly no practice
in the industry to continuously search for subsequent filers when
simply collecting out accounts previously purchased.
Moreover, under a new provision, section 9-330(d), Financer
may prevail as to the check even if it is not a holder in due course (for
example, if it had notice or knowledge of a security interest in the
account taken subsequent to its purchase of the account), provided it
gave value and took possession of the check in good faith (same
standard as required for holder in due course status) "and without
knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party."
In this case, factual determinations would have to be made. Even if
Financer knew of Factor's acquisition of Account #2 (as contrasted
with the taking by a lender of a security interest), it would not
necessarily have knowledge of a violation of Factor's rights; although
Factor bought the accounts, it apparently allowed the Debtor to
continue to collect, and possibly to use, the proceeds.
Q20. Debtor signed a security agreement in favor of Bank.
Sometime later, Debtor discovered that the financing statement filed
by Bank in connection with the transaction covers tax refunds. In the
honestly held belief that the security agreement did not cover tax
refunds, Debtor filed a correction statement that properly identified
the financing statement to which it related, indicated that it was a
correction statement, provided the basis for Debtor's belief that the
financing statement is inaccurate, and indicated that the indication of
collateral in the financing statement should be amended to delete the
reference to tax refunds. Is Bank's security interest perfected with
respect to a tax refund received by Debtor shortly thereafter? Does
the answer depend on the description of collateral set forth in the
security agreement?
A20. The correction statement appears to be sufficient under
section 9-518(b). Debtor had a right to file it under section 9-518(a).
Under section 9-518(c), however, the "filing of a correction statement
does not affect the effectiveness of an initial financing statement."
63. See R. § 9-331(a), (c).
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Thus, if Bank has a security interest in the tax refund, the financing
statement is effective to perfect. Whether Bank is entitled to file the
financing statement covering tax refunds depends on whether Debtor
had authorized the filing. This might be automatic by virtue of
coverage of tax refunds in the security agreement or it might derive
from some other record authenticated by Debtor. Even a financing
statement the filing of which is authorized, however, does not expand
the scope of collateral covered by a security interest. Whether Bank
has a security interest in the tax refund depends on the collateral
description in the security agreement,64 not on the indication of
collateral in the financing statement.
64. See id. § 9-203(b).
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